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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal was originally taken to the Supreme Court of
Utah pursuant to the authority granted in Rule 3(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for review of a judgment entered against
the Appellants after trial by jury.

Subsequently, the Supreme

Court of Utah poured-over this case to t^he Court of Appeals for
disposition.

3

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment entered against the Appellants by the Third Judicial District Court after trial by jury of
their wrongful death action.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed

reversible

error

by

giving

jury

instruction

No.

20

(addendum p. 17).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellants, heirs of decedent Ted Newsom, brought a
wrongful death cause of action against the Respondent, Gold Cross
Service, Inc., a business in Salt Lake County which operates an
ambulance

service.

The

Appellants

alleged

that

Gold

Cross

Ambulance and its employees were negligent in failing to dispatch
in a timely manner an ambulance which had been requested after
Ted Newsom became ill and subsequently died shortly thereafter.
The Appellants alleged that had the ambulance arrived in a timely
manner,

Ted

Newsom

would have had

(R.239-244)
4

some chance of survival.

II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial of the case commenced on September 8, 1987 and
lasted until September 14, 1987.

The Honorable John Rokich,

District Judge, submitted his instructions to the jury, including
instruction No. 20 (R.498).

The Appellants made an exception to

Jury Instruction No. 20 (T. 159) .

The jury returned a special

verdict finding that the Respondent, Gold Cross Services, was
negligent as alleged by the Appellants.

The jury further found

that the negligence on the part of the Respondent was not a
proximate cause of the death of Ted Newsom (R.597-598).
III.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Judge Rokich entered judgment on the verdict on November 9,
1987 ordering that the Appellants be awarded no money damages and
that the action be dismissed on the merits.

(R.627-628)

IV.
RELEVANT FACTS
On May 3, 1984, Ted Newsom was at the Sugar Street Cafe in
Midvale, Utah and fell after becoming ill.

Immediately there-

after, a call from the Sugar Street Cafe was made to 911 Emergency Services.

The 911 Emergency Services transferred the call

to the Salt Lake City 911 fire department dispatcher.

At 4:00

p.m. on the same date, the fire dispatcher contacted the Gold
5

Cross ambulance dispatcher (R.126).

Between 4:00 p.m. and 4:05

p.m., the Gold Cross dispatcher paged its nearest ambulance to
the Sugar Street Cafe four different times.

The Gold Cross

dispatcher stated that the nearest Gold Cross Ambulance was not
answering

the page

(R.128).

At

4:05

p.m.,

the Gold

Cross

dispatcher dispatched a second ambulance to the Sugar Street
Cafe.

Upon dispatching the second ambulance, the Gold Cross

ambulance dispatcher discontinued trying to contact the nearest
ambulance.

At 4:10 p.m., the Midvale police dispatcher cancelled

the Gold Cross ambulance because a Midvale ambulance was enroute

(R.129).

Between 4:17 p.m. and 6:18 p.m., the Midvale

ambulance arrived at the Sugar Street Cafe.

At 4:39 p.m., the

Midvale ambulance transported the deceased to Cottonwood Hospital
(R.130).

Had the Gold Cross dispatcher been able to contact the

nearest Gold Cross ambulance promptly, the ambulance could have
arrived

at the Sugar Street Cafe within approximately

minutes without lights and sirens.

three

It would have taken the Gold

Cross ambulance approximately five to six minutes to travel from
the Sugar Street Cafe to Cottonwood Hospital (R.137).
At trial, the Appellants called Dr. Frank Yanowitz, M.D.,
cardiologist, to testify on their behalf.
presented

with

a

hypothetical

question

Dr. Yanowitz was

which

assumed

facts

substantiated by evidence presented by the Appellants at trial
(T.9-13).

Based upon the hypothetical, Dr. Yanowitz concluded
6

that had the Gold Cross Ambulance arrived at the Sugar Street
Cafe prior to 4:13 p.m., with appropriate medical equipment, Mr.
Newsom would have had at least a 70% to 80% chance of survival
(T.12-13).

On cross examination, the Respondent presented Dr.

Yanowitz with an alternative hypothetical based upon evidence
presented by the Respondent during trial.

Dr. Yanowitz gave his

opinion that given the facts as presented by the Respondent, Mr.
Ted Newsom would have had less than a 50% chance of survival.
(T.36-38)

I

The Respondents called Dr. John Parry, M.D., a cardiologist
who

testified

that

in

a hospital

where

there

are

infinite

resources and the best of everything, the prognosis would have
been poor for Ted Newsom and that he probably had less than a 5%
chance of survival, (T.54-56).

On cross examination, Dr. Parry

was asked to assume the Appellant's version of the facts and Dr.
Parry admitted that certain medical equipment on board of the
Gold Cross ambulance would have been medically helpful in respect
to Ted Newsom's condition (T.72).

The Respondents also called

Dr. Jeff Clausen, M.D., a specialist in emergency medicine, who
testified on direct examination that even if Ted Newsom would
have received appropriate medical care, his chances of survival
would have been minimal (T.131).

Dr. Clausen testified that Ted

Newsom had a 9% probability of survival (T.135-136).
The trial court's jury instruction No. 20, with which the
7

Appellants took an exception, states as follows:
The plaintiffs are not entitled to recover against the
defendants merely by showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that such defendants failed to conform to the
standard of care elsewhere defined in these instructions. The plaintiffs must also prove, by a preponderance of expert medical testimony, that the death of Ted
Newsom, of which the plaintiffs complain, probably
would not have occurred if such defendant had conformed
to the standard of care. In this connection, it is not
enough for the plaintiffs to have shown that the result
might have been different, or that there is a possibility that the result would have been different, had the
defendant conformed to the standard of care.
In other words, unless the plaintiffs have proven, by a
preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the
result probably would have been different if the
defendant had conformed to the standard of care, as
defined in these instructions, then the plaintiffs have
not proved that any injury or loss sustained by them
was proximately caused the conduct of the defendant.
(R.498, Addendum p. 17)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The erroneous instruction precluded the jury from awarding
damages upon a finding of a lost chance of survival of less than
50%.

Some jurisdictions accept the rule as enunciated in the

erroneous instruction, whereas other jurisdictions have accepted
variations of an alternative rule that full recovery can be made
even if the possibility of survival is less than 50%. The better
reasoned view, accepted by the Supreme Court of Utah, is that
recovery can be made even where the lost chance is less than 50%,
and that it is the prerogative of the jury to place a value on
the lost chance.

8

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
The issue in this case is whether a wrongful death recovery
for damages can be made where negligence on the part of the
defendant has resulted in a loss of chance of survival of less
than 50% on the part of the decedent.
The jurisdictions considering this issue have taken three
different approaches.

The first approach is the same approach

used by the trial court in the instant case.

Where medical

malpractice has resulted in a loss of chance of survival, the
defendant has the burden of proving that had proper treatment
been rendered, the decedent probably would have survived.

In

other words, probability is defined as that which is more likely
than not or greater than 50%.

Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of

Cinncinati. 27 Ohio St.2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).

In this

approach, a mere loss of an unspecified increment of the chance
for survival is insufficient to meet the standard of probability.
Hiser v. Randoff, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (1980).
In the second approach, the plaintiff does not have the
burden of proving that the decedent's chance of survival was more
probable than not, or greater than 50%; the plaintiff need only
show that there would have been a substantial possibility of
survival had the proper medical treatment been rendered.

The

lost chance cannot be so insubstantial as to amount to sheer
speculation, but the chance of survival does not need to have
9

been 51% or more before it was reduced.

Waffen v. U. S. Depart-

ment of Health and Human Services, 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. , 1986).
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99
Wash.2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983), the court, taking the above
approach, held that recovery could be made where the decedent's
chance of survival was reduced from 30% to 25% because of medical
malpractice, reasoning as follows:
To decide otherwise would be a blanket release from
liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was
less than a 50% chance of survival, regardless of how
flagrant the negligence. (99 Wash.2d 609,611, 664 P.2d
474,477)
In

Kallenberg

v.

Beth

Israel

Hospital.

45 A.D.2d

177, 357

N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615, 337
N.E.2d 128 (1975), the decedent was denied a 20% to 40% chance of
survival because of medical malpractice and the court allowed
recovery.

In Jeanes v. Miller, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970), the

court held that Plaintiff could recover where medical malpractice
had lessened the decedents 35% chance of survival.
The third approach, accepted by at least one jurisdiction,
allows recovery for loss of chance of survival no matter how
small.

James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Calif.,

1980) .

In James, the court indicates that existing authority

requires,

at

a

minimum,

that

defendant

actually

destroy

a

"substantial possibility of survival," but the facts of the case
seem to indicate that the court in practice has allowed a more
10

relaxed standard.

In this case, plaintiffs apparently failed to

sustain their burden of proof that a tumor was operable at a
given time which was a condition precedent to finding that the
decedent

had

a

10% to

15% chance of

surviving

five years.

However, the court held that plaintiff's failure to establish the
premise for the loss of a statistically measurable chance of
survival does not prevent recovery.

The court concluded that a

plaintiff may be compensated for any aggravation of his injury or
shortening of his life span proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence, even though other factors contributed to or caused
the initial condition.
In all three of the above approaches, all provable damages
are generally recoverable if the burden of proof has been met by
the plaintiff.

Thus, in the first approach, if the decedent was

denied a 60% chance of survival, the plaintiff would be entitled
to

receive

100% of his

damages.

Inj the

second

and third

approach, if the decedent was denied a 30% chance of recovery,
the plaintiff would nevertheless be entitled to 100% of his
damages.

Professor Joseph H. King, Jr., in his law review

article entitled "Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences,"

90

Yale

L.J.,

1353

(1981),

has

criticized

approaches used by courts in loss of chance cases.
that the better reasoned approach is a follows:
11

the

He indicates

Causation has for the most part been treated as an all
or nothing proposition. Either a loss was caused by
the defendant or was not.... (A) plaintiff ordinarily
should be required to prove by the applicable standard
of proof that the defendant caused the loss in question.
What causes a loss, however, should be a
separate question from what the nature and extent of
the loss are. This distinction seems to have alluded
the courts, with the result that lost chances in many
respects are compensated either as certainties or not
at all.
To illustrate, consider the case in which a doctor
negligently fails to diagnose a patient's cancerous
condition until is has become inoperable.
Assume
further that even with a timely diagnosis the patient
would have had only a 30% chance of recovering from the
disease and surviving over the long term. There are
two ways of handing such a case. Under the traditional
approach, this loss of a not-better-than-even chance of
recovering from the cancer would not be compensable
because it did not appear more likely than not that the
patient would have survived with proper care. Recoverable damages, if any, would depend on the extent to
which it appeared that cancer killed the patient sooner
than it would have with timely diagnosis and treatment,
and on the extent to which the delay in diagnosis
aggravated the patient's condition, such as by causing
additional pain.
A more rational approach, however,
would allow recpvery for the loss of the chance of cure
even though the chance was not better than even. The
probability of long term survival would be reflected in
the amount of damages awarded for the loss of the
chance.
While the plaintiff here could not prove a
preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a cure
by the defendant's negligence, he could show by a
preponderance that he was deprived of a 30% chance of a
cure.
(90 Yale L.J. at 1363-64) (Emphasis added in
article)
Further reasoning by Professor King reveals that the all-ornothing approach cannot be defended.

The first reason is because

of the patently arbitrary nature of the approach.
trary to deny recovery

to a victim denied
12

It seems arbi-

a 49% chance of

recovery as opposed to a victim denied a 51% chance of recovery.
Furthermore, the all-or-nothing approach is obviously at odds
with the basic rationale of the tort system which is designed to
deter wrongful conduct.

The all-or-nothing approach will have no

incentive to medical practitioners to render proper care where
the chance of survival would be less than 50% in the first place.
In addition, the patent injustice of the all-or-nothing approach
will create distortions and legal fictions in respect to rules
surrounding causation and damages. (Yale L.J. at 1376-78)
The court in Waffen, supra, obviously approved of much of
Professor

King's

approval the

approach.

language used

The

court,

citing

with

obvious

in Professor King's illustration,

states as follows:
...In analyzing problems of this nature, it is better
to consider the loss of a substantial chance of
survival as a different type of loss with a different
measure of damages than the loss of life, instead of
treating the former as a variation on the burden of
proving causation in a claim for negligently causing
the patient's death.
The destroyed chance itself is
the compensable loss. (799 F.2d 911,919)
Unfortunately, the court was not able to accept completely the
more rational approach and continued to insist upon a "substantial possibility" standard.

Even a "substantial possibility"

standard would be at odds with Professor King's more rational
approach and would be subject to the same criticisms of arbitrariness and possible distortion of the tort system.
The Supreme Court of Utah has already adopted the better
13

reasoned approach as early as 1970 in a factual context which is
not substantially
instant case.

different than the factual

context of the

In Brown v. Johnson. 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942

(1970), the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and
sustained bodily injury.

At trial, a doctor testified that the

plaintiff had a 15% chance of requiring surgery in the future.
The defendants assigned error to the trial court for refusing to
instruct the jury that nothing could be awarded for possible
surgery.

The defendants

apparently thought that unless the

plaintiff had over a 50% chance of having surgery, no award could
be made.

The court rejected the defendant's argument and stated

as follows:
In order to recover damages for any injury or harm, the
plaintiff must convince the jury by a preponderance of
the evidence that the injury has been or will be
sustained.
This does not mean that the chances of
sustaining the harm must be over 50%. It means that
the jury must be convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is a definite risk of harm, and
when so convinced, the jury will evaluate the risk.
Here the preponderance of the evidence was to the
effect that 15 out of each 100 people in the condition
of the plaintiff would positively require future
surgery. There is nothing speculative about it. The
percentage is certain. The value to placed upon the
percentage is for the jury to determine. If the law
were as Defendant hoped it is and there were 100 cases
like the instant one, the jury would know that 15 of
the plaintiffs would surely require the surgery and be
entitled to recover therefore, yet none of them could
recover because no one plaintiff could convince the
jury that he himself had more than a 50% chance of
requiring the surgery.
This reasoning would give an
undeserved advantage to the wrongdoing defendant. (24
Utah 2d 388,392, 472 P.2d 942,945)
14

In light of Brown, it is apparent that the Supreme Court of
Utah has long ago adopted the better reasoned approach.

The

Supreme Court has been able to make the critical distinction
referred to by Professor King which has alluded other courts.
The Supreme Court has separated the question of causation of a
loss from the nature and extent of the loss.
factual

context

involves

a percentage

Although the

possibility

of

future

surgery, the principles enunciated therein are equally applicable
to the factual context involved where a chance of survival by the
decedent has been lost because of medical malpractice.

In Brown.

the plaintiff had a small chance of requiring future surgery and
this injury was compensable, with the jury to determine the value
to be placed upon the chance of future surgery.

In a case

involving a small loss of chance of survival because of negligence, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly allow recovery for the
loss of chance, with the jury to determine the value of the lost
chance.

These two factual contexts are nothing more than two

sides of the same coin.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
In light of Brown, the trial court's jury instruction No. 20
in the instant case was contrary to Utah Law.

There was evidence

presented at trial upon which the jury could have found that Ted
Newsom had less than a 50% chance of survival which was removed
because of Respondent's negligence.
15

However, jury instruction

No. 20 precluded the jury from awarding appropriate damages.
The Appellants respectfully request the Court of Appeals to
reverse the Order of the District Court and remand for a new
trial on the issue of proximate cause and damages.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1988.
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INSTRUCTION NO. -A

The plaintiffs

are not entitled to recover against the

defendants merely by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that such defendant failed to conform to the standard of care
elsewhere defined in these instructions.

The plaintiffs must

also prove, by a preponderance of expert medical testimony, that
the

death

of Ted Newsom, of which the plaintiffs

complain,

probably would not have occurred if such defendant had conformed
to the standard of care.

In this connection, it is not enough

for the plaintiffs to have shown that the result might have been
different, or that there is a possibility that the result would
have been different, had the defendant conformed to the standard
of care.
In other words, unless the plaintiffs have proved, by a
preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the result
probably would have been different if the defendant had conformed
to the standard of care, as defined in these instructions, then
the plaintiffs have not proved that any injury or loss sustained
by them was proximately caused the conduct of the defendant.

ADDENDUM
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